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THE PREAMBLE AND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF
THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION.
THE PREAMBLE
The constitution of 1776 was adopted not as were its
successors directly by the people of the state, but by a convention. The members of this convention, after reciting
the decision of the people to separate from the British Empire declare that "We, the representatives of the freemen
of Pennsylvania, in general convention met, for the express
purpose of framing such a government, confessing the
goodness of the great governor of the universe (who alone

knows to what degree of earthly happiness mankind may
attain by perfecting the arts of government,) in permitting

the people of the state by common consent, and without
violence, deliberately to form for themselves such just rules

as they shall think

best, for governing

their

future

society * * * * do, by virtue of the authority vested in

us by our constituents, ordain, declare and establish the
following declaration of rights and frame of government, to
be the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and to remain in
force therein forever, unaltered, except in such articles as
shall hereafter on experience, be found to require improvement and which shall, by the authority of the people, fairly
delegated as this frame of government directs, be amended
or improved for the more effectual obtaining and securing
the great end and design of all governments herein before
mentioned."
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In 1790 the Revolutionary War was over. The confederation which had been formed had been superseded by
the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. That
instrument was preceded by a so-called preamble, in which
the act of ordaining the constitution is declared to be the
act of the people of the United States and their purposes in
so doing are stated. When then, in -that year, the people of
Pennsylvania created a new constitution for themselves, they
introduced it by the words "We,
the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ordain and establish this constitution for their government," words evidently suggested by
the preamble to the federal constitution. No reference to
the Deity is made in either.
In 1838 another constitution was enacted, the introduction to which is "We, the people of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, ordain and establish this constitution for
its (not as in the preceding constitution, 'for their') government."
This, again, expresses a purely secular act, in a
secular spirit.
In 1873, the present constitution was adopted and the
introductory words, for the first time styled preamble, are
" We, the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
grateful to Almighty God for the blessings of civil and
religious liberty, and humbly invoking His guidance, do ordain and establish this Constitution."
For the first time
since 1776, do the people, in adopting the Constitution
profess to advert to God, and to bear towards Him any
particular attitude. In so doing, they break with the policy
of the great men who framed the instrument of 1787 and
who deemed a government a purely secular contrivance
whose function was totally disconnected from the em9tions
and practices of religion. Their preamble expresses gratitude for only one thing, " liberty."
There must be many
other things for which gratitude would be equally appropriate and obligatory, and equally agreeable to the Almighty. Since in ordaining the constitution, the people
were doing a sovereign act, civil and religious liberty could
be simply the result of their own abstinence from trenching too much on the spontaneity of individuals. If the people meant to thank God for the absence within the state of a
foreign power which limited liberty, this harking back to

the expulsion of the British power, nearly a hundred years
after its accomplishments, is remarkable. Had gratitude for
it been in abeyance? Had it been perceived that the ex-
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pression of corporate gratitude should no longer be
omitted?
The Commission appointed to revise the Constitution
proposes to allow the preamble to remain, as it was written in 1873. We are to continue to be grateful because we,
the sovereign people, who alone can interfere with liberty,
do not interfere with it; or because the Federal Government, that operates also in the state, does not interfere with
it.
RELATION TO RELIGION
The declaration of rights, it seems, is to continue unchanged, as it was in 1790, and has remained in the constitution of 1838, and 1873, save in one respect, "We
find '"says the Commission " no necessity for any changes
in the bill of rights."
The legislature of 1872, in the Act of April 11th of
that year, providing for the calling of a convention to
amend the Constitution, stipulated '"That nothing herein
contained shall authorize the said convention to change the
language, or to alter in any manner the several provisions
of the 9th article, commonly known as the declaration of
rights, but the same shall be excepted from the powers given
to said convention, and shall be and remain inviolate forever." Why the declaration of rights contained in the constitution of 1776, which continued in force until 1790
should have been allowed to be superseded by that of
1790, does not appear. If sanctity could attach to such a
composition it would seem that the declaration made shortly after the beginning of the Revolutionary War, and which
lasted for 14 years, and bore the signature of Benjamin
Franklin should possess it, rather than one composed in
1790, at a time of profound peace.
In declining to make any changes in the declaration of
1790, the Commissioners state " To-day, as throughout our
history as a state (they should have said, except the first 14
transcendently interesting and momentous years) it expresses the fundamental principles upon which rest the
rights of the citizen to the protection of his person and
property. Study and reflection convince us that no alteration should be made either in substance or in form, and
therefore Article I of the constitution as prepared is identical
with Article I of the present Constitution."
The object of a bill of rights is to designate classes of
possible interferences by the government of the state with
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the actions of individuals, which it, the state will direct its
government to abstain from in favor of the independence
of the individuals. Let us see how the freedom with respect
to religion is treated in the federal constitution. "No law
is to be made by Congress respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Amendments Art. I Art. III say " No religious test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the United States." The Constitution of Pennsylvania of
1790 adopted two years later, and all the succeeding
constitutions say, " That no person who acknowledges the
being of a God and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall on account of his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of trust or profit under
this commonwealth."
To be exempt from risk of disqualification for office holding, one must believe both in
the being of a God, and in a future state of rewards and
punishments. The constitution is far less liberal in this
matter than the sentiment of the people for a century has
been, and it is to be regretted that no effort is to be made
to harmonize the doctrine with the practice.
The Constitution of 1776 indicates a conception of
religious freedom similar to that expressed in the constitution of 1790. It declared that all men have a natural and
unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to
the dictates of their own consciences and understanding.
And that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship or erect or support any place of
worship, or maintain any ministry contrary to or against
his own free will and consent. Nor can any man who
acknowledges the being of a God be justly deprived or
abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his
religious sentiment or peculiar mode of religious worship.
And that no authority can or ought to be vested in or assumed by any power whatever that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the right of conscience
in the free exercise of religious worship. The acknowledger of a God may not be deprived of any civil right.
The implication is that one who does not acknowledge the
being of a God may be justly deprived of some civil rights
as a citizen because of his opinions or mode of religious
worship. The opinions of this age are widely different, in
this respect, from that of the year 1790, but, the declaration
of rights, to be adopted in 192-2 or later, is, if the rec-
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ommendation of the Commission is ratified a reversion to
the conception of 130 years ago.
An illustration of the limitations on religious liberty
conceived permissible in 1776, is found in the constitution
of that year. The legislative power was vested in a single
chamber, whose members, before taking their seats were
required to make the following declaration, viz:
"I do believe in one God, the creator and governor
of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the punisher
of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of
the Old and New Testament to be given by Divine
inspiration."
The statement is then added " And no further or other
religious test shall ever hereafter be required of any civil
officer or magistrate in this state."
Accordingly, under that constitution, all persons who
did not believe in the inspiration of the New Testament, e.
g. Jews, Rationalists, might be excluded from any office.
There is nothing in the declaration of rights of 1790, and
later periods to the present, that clearly forbids this
effect.
The 3rd section of the Pennsylvania declaration of
rights is " ( ) That All men have a natural and indefeasible
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences; (2) that no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or
to maintain any ministry against his consent; (3) that no
human authority can in any case whatever, control or interfere with the right of conscience, and that no preference
shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishments
or modes of worship."
As to the part marked 1, of this section, it may be
noted that it secures the man who worships God in any
mode, from molestation, but it offers no protection to the
man who does not worship or profess to worship, God. If
he has a conscience, and it dictates a mode of worship, he
has an indefeasible right, that is, a right which shall not be
interfered with by the state, or by its authority, to worship
in that mode, but to the non-worshipper no protection is
extended. In this respect the section fails to express the
living purpose of the people of the state, and, instead of
being useful, is possibly pernicious. It would shock public sentiment to impose disabilities of any sort on men because they were irreligious.
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Part 2 forbids compelling men, to attend any church
or erect or support any church, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. Compelled against his cofisent is a
form of thought which even its antiquity can scarcely
sanction.
Part 3 negatives any human authority's controlling or
interfering with the rights of conscience. But, is there a
right of conscience to be heretical; to be atheistic; to refuse altogether to worship anything? There may be not
merely a "right of conscience' but a right having no relation to conscience. Is the state to recognize no right of
Godlessness, of blank irreligion?
"No preference shall
ever be given by law to any religious establishments or
modes of worship," but may a mode of worship be preferred to no mode of worship? May religion be preferred
to irreligion? The Constitution of the United States forbids any law respecting an establishment of religion, and, in
so doing, seems to extend a broader franchise than does
that of this state. Under that constitution it would not
have been possible partially to establish Christianity by forbidding, as does the act of April 22d, 1794, the doing of
secular work on the " Lord's Day, commonly called Sunday " the intention of which is to compel the observance of
one of the institutions of the prevalent religions, by secular
penalties. We cannot but believe that the declaration of
right could have been made better to accord with the vastly
preponderant sentiment of the people who are going to establish a new constitution for Pennsylvania.
THE

POLICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

THE

The makers of the constitution of 1790 and of all
succeeding constitutions of Pennsylvania have announced
the same declaration of rights. The purpose of doing so,
they say, is that the general, great and essential principles
of liberty and free government may be recognized and unalterably established. "A principle may have three qualities, it seems. It may be general, it may be great, and it
may be essential. Would not any one of these words have
been enough to express the composer's thought? In what
respect is a principle great, if not general; if not essential?
The first of these general, great and essential principles
is that " all men a-e born equally free and independent"
and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights. The
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Declaration of Independence considered men at their
creation, and found them to be then equal. "We hold
these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created
equal." The framers of the State constitution look at men
at their birth, and make an astonishing discovery. They
" declare" that men are,not equal, but " equally free and
independent." To affirm freedom and independence of
the new-born human child-the very image of dependence-is indeed a bold and startling figure of speech. How
are the properties of things to be discovered except by observation; and whether, at birth two human beings are
free and equally free, independent and equally independent can be known only by looking at them and watching
them. Whether they ought to be free and equally free,
may, for the apriorist be the subject of a " principle,. a
great, general and essential principle. But the enouncers of
this principle did not seriously entertain it, and many decades had to elapse before the people of Pennsylvania believed in the equal freedom and independence of blacks
and whites, whether at birth or afterwards.
- All men " have certain inherent and indefeasible
rights. The rights are. Indefeasible," the enumerated
rights are not. They can be extinguished by crime. They
can be ignored by the state, when it enters into war and
compels men to sacrifice liberty, and the pursuit of their
own happiness, for ends which sometimes they do not desire to have realized. It is of dubious benefit to the people,
to concede to them, for rhetorical objects, what must be
taken from them, in the actual evolution of government.
THE DEPOSITARY OF POLITICAL POWER
The 2d section of the Declaration announces that " All
power is inherent in the people." All power means probably all political power, all power to impose prohibitions
and commands upon human beings. But who are " the
people " in whom this power inheres? All or some? Not
all, for minors, until recently, women, for a considerable
time negroes, foreign sojourners, sometimes men without a
described minimum of intelligence, have no political power.
They are a subject class. So, this great and essential and
general principle, when interpreted by the conduct of the
state, means, " All political power is inherent in those of
the people, in whom, with the consent of the state, it does
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inhere," a principle as luminous and beneficent as it is
'general, great and essential."

POWER TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION
For the advancement of their peace, safety and happiness the people " have at all times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government, in such manner as they may think proper." The
reader of these imposing words would hardly suspect that
the constitution to which they are prefixed, does not allow
a change of the government, except with the consent of the
existing government. Art. XVIII of the constitution of
1873, requires two legislatures to agree to a proposed
amendment, and to submit it to the voters. Wells vs. Bain,
75 Pa. 39, asserts that there is another mode, not provided
for in the constitution of 1838 (whose provision for amendment is verbatim the same as that of the present constitution), viz. a call by the legislature of a convention to make
changes, total or partial, in the constitution, but denies that
there is any other way by which a convention can be
brought into existence, or that the convention when called,
can amend any part of the constitution, or propose a totally
new one, unless the legislature has authorized it. Should a
convention be called, and should it transcend its legislatively bestowed authority, its act would be void. The
power of the people is dependent, then, on the consent of at
least one legislature. A legislature may refuse to give them
an opportunity to form a convention. What is the solace?
This is it, as described by Agnew C. J. in the cited case.
- If the legislature possessing these powers of government,
be unwilling to pass a law to take the sense of the people,
or to delegate to a convention all the powers the people
desire to confer upon their delegates, the remedy is still in
their own hands; they can elect new representatives that
will." They can elect new representatives, but what guaranty is there that they "will " ? They may; they probably will. They may not. Meanwhile where is the power
of the people at all times to alter, reform or abolish their
government, in such manner as they may think proper?
Chief-Justice Agnew, in the case cited, contemplates the possibility that the first, the second, or third, or
fourth legislature would refuse to permit the people to form
a constitutional convention. What then?
" If their representatives are still unfaithful, or the government becomes
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tyrannical the right of revolution yet remains." A strange
right. Every act in its prosecution, is rebellion, treason,
and the perpetrator of it may be put to death or otherwise punished. Yet he has a right to do what he doesi He
thinks he has a moral right, but he has no legal right; the
state against which he revolts, denies that he has a right to
do what he does, and all its courts when he is haled before
them, will say that he has committed the highest possible
crime, treason.
The Constitution of Iowa had a declaration of the
rights of the people, at all times to alter or reform the government. In Koehler vs. Hill 60 Iowa 543 Chief-Justice
Day holds nugatory an amendment ratified by a majority
of 30,000 of the voters, because four words were in the
proposal, as considered by the senate of the 18th assembly, that were not in that voted on by the House, and by
the senate and house of the 19th assembly. He says that
the change of constitution can take place only in the prescribed mode. The supporters of change may, if able, establish it by superior force - If they are powerful enough
to succeed, well. They will have altered or reformed the
government. But, if they are not powerful enough to succeed, their attempt to overthrow the government is treason,
and they are liable to punishment as traitors." To escape
this punishment they must destroy the punitory government, yet the courts of that government talk of a right of
revolution. From the standpoint of every government,
and of every court or other agent of every government,
there is no right to change it, except in the prescribed mode,
the mode permitted by the government itself. The declaration in Section 2 of Article I of the constitution is untrue, and should have been eliminated as soon as the
anarchic doctrines which attended the Revolution, had
ceased to be current.
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MOOT COURT
WILCOX VS. HEMPHILL
Orphans' Court Sale-When Title Passes-Distinguishing Private
Executory Contracts
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X died owning a tract of land on which a tree stood which
was old and rotten and threatening to fall. The Administrator of
X sold the land under the order of the Orphans Court, made a report of the sale to the court which confirmed it. Hemphill was
the purchaser. Before the payment of the purchase price, and
the delivery of the deed to Hemphill, the tree fell, prostrating
a shop on the neighboring land of Wilcox. He sues for damages.
Stone for the Plaintiff.
Tenenbaum for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Stevens, J. This was an action for damages brought against
the purchaser at an Orphans' Court sale by the owner of an adjacent piece of property. Although the sale had been confirmed
by the court, the purchase money had not been paid, nor the deed
delivered.
The question is whether or not the purchaser had sufficient
title to allow an action for damages to be brought against him.
There can be no doubt that in a private executory contract for the sale of real estate that the purchaser obtains an
equitable property right in the land and can maintain a suit for
specific performance. Furthermore because of this equitable title
he becomes liable for any deterioration in the value of the land
and is benefited by any increase, between the time of the sale
and the conveyance of the perfect legal title. He is considered
for many intents and purposes as though he were the owner.
But the courts of this commonwealth have seen fit to draw
a distinction between private executory contracts for the sale of
land and those sales which are ordered by the Orphans Court, in
order to pay the debts of a decedent, saying, "that the reasons
which apply to private executory contracts of sale, and which
have led to the establishment of the principle that a vendee by
article is, in equity, the owner of the land which was the subject of the contract, and as such, must run the hazard of any deterioration in its value, that may take place before the conveyance of the perfect title, do not apply with equal force to Orphans' Court sales for the payment of the debts of a decedent.
Such sales are not absolute and unconditional. They depend
for their validity upon the approval and confirmation of the
court. They are liable to be vacated by a power superior to the
purchaser and against his will. The sale even after confirmation
does not divest the title of the heirs of the decedent, for it re-
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mains in the power of the court, until a deed has been executed
and delivered." Demmy's Appeal 43 Pa. 155; Brennan's Estate
220 Pa. 232.
In the case at bar the purchase money had not been paid nor
the deed delivered, and therefore the title was not in the
defendant.
Mr. Justice Kephart in Morris vs. Fahey, 66 Superior Ct., 81
had arrived at the same conclusion in a very similar case and although the learned counsel for the plaintiff has sought to distinguish them, we fail to find any material or substantial difference. From his findings then, we are not inclined to dissent.
The court is therefore of opinion that the plaintiff must be
nonsuited.
NONSUIT.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
But little need be added to the opinion of the learned court
below. X's heirs became, at his death, the owners of the land.
Only they had the right of possession, and we may presume, were
in possession. While probably they would, after the administrator's
sale, have been liable for waste for any injury to the property,
they only, except the plaintiff himself, had the right and therefore they only had the duty, to prevent, by cutting it down, the
fall of the tree to the injury of the plaintiff.
Not until delivery of the deed did the defendant become
owner of the land, with the right to enter upon it and cut down
the tree. Until that time, the Orphan's Court might have withdrawn its confirmation of the sale for reasons given to it. The
want of right in the defendant to enter implies the freedom of
responsibility for not doing what he had no right to do. The
judgment of the learned court is therefore affirmed.
REX vs. COMMISSIONERS OF COUNTY
Bounty Statutes-Submission of Proof-Effect of Repeal of Act
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A statute gave a bounty to such persons as should kill certain noxious animals. While this statute was in operation Rex.
killed several animals of this class and became entitled to $10.00
from the County Commissioners.
Before he submitted proofs to them of his acts the statute
was repealed and the commissioners therefore refused to pay the
bounty.
Coover for the Plaintiff.
Douglas for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Crunkleton, .- The question in this case is whether an action can be maintained upon proof of acts, submitted after the
repeal of the statute providing recovery for those acts.
Since the Plaintiff acted in good faith, and did the acts for
which he was entitled, under the statute, to recover a bounty, it
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would seem that there was at least a moral obligation on the
part of the defendants to compensate Rex for his trouble. But
the law is otherwise, is well settled, and is correct on principle,
and we are not disposed to disagree with it.
The Plaintiff in this case did not wholly comply with this
statute. He performed the act, as provided therein, but failed
to submit his proof until after the statute had been repealed. He
is not entitled to recover on this partial performance.
If proof of the act was allowed after the statute was repealed, bounties could be recovered after such repeal by the
mere statement by witnesses, that the act was done a year or two
years ago when such statute was in full effect. The repeal of the
act therefore would be futile and the recovery would only be barred by the statute of limitations.
Repeal of a statute conferring jurisdiction on a court takes
away all right to hear or determine the cause based on the statute
and in the absence of special provisions in the repealing statute,
such proceeding must be dismissed. To support this statement
the able counsel for the defendant cites-25 R. C. L. 937.
The courts go so far as to hold that where there is an action
pending, based on a statute, the repeal of such statute will cause
the action to be dismissed. In 57 Pa. 433, it was held that when
a statute givinga special remedy is repealed, pending proceedings die with the repeal of the statute. To the same effect is the
case of Commonwealth vs. Beattey, I Watts. 382, which holds that
where a statute gives a remedy and proceedings are instituted under it, but while proceedings were pending, statute was repealed,
there can be no recovery. The remedy was taken away and further proceedings to enforce it were illegal. In 24 Pa. 55, it was
held that proceedings commenced under a statute were repealed
with the law on which they stood; the attempt to prosecute them
subsequently was effete. Again in Norris vs. Crooker, 54 U. S. 429,
an action was brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of the
penalty provided by the act of Congress, dated February 12,
1793. In September, 1850, another act was passed which repealed the act of 1793 as regards the penalty. The action was
brought before the repeal of the act of 1793 but was pending at
the time of the passage of the act of 1850. It was held that
where such an action was pending at the time of the repeal, such
repeal is a bar to the action. These cases differ from the one at
bar in that the action was brought while the act was in force but
were pending at time of repeal. If such an action was barred by
the repeal of the statute, the present action should be dismissed,
as there was no -statute under which it could be maintained.
Where a st. is repealed, it is to be considered as if it never existed
and all proceedings founded upon it, which have not ripened into
judgment, must fall. Action dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The statute offered a bounty to such persons as should kill
certain described animals. This offer could be accepted by any
one, by doing the act solicited. Thus a contract would be made.
The plaintiff did the act in reference to the offer. The obligation
of the county thus became complete.
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No state can Impair, by any law, the obligation of a contract.
Hence, although the statute offering rewards could be repealed,
that is; although the offer of such reward could be withdrawn as
to any that had not by action accepted it, the repeal would be
void as to such as had accepted it. Such is the view taken by
Mintz vs. Scowden, 69 Super. 228, and Steamship Co. vs. Joleffe,
69 U. S. 450.
It follows then, that the right of the plaintiff to the reward,
which he had won by his act of killing noxious animals, could not
be taken away by a repeal of the legislation. The judgment of
the learned court below must therefore be reversed, and judgment entered for the plaintiff.
REVERSED.

PRINCE vs. SHARPLES
Evidence-Delivery of Deed-When Title Passes-Equity
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prince and Dorn owned undivided halves of a tract of land.
Prince agrees to convey his half to Sharples if Dorn would convey
his. A deed was made naming both Prince and Dorn as grantors.
Prince executed the deed, and alleges (in his bill for the cancellation of the deed) that it was delivered to Sharples on his
promise to procure the execution of it by Dorn, and if not, to return it to Prince within one week. Dorn refused to sign it, but
Sharples did not return the deed. The defense is parol inadmissable to contradict the import of the delivery of the deed. The
evidence would tend to make the deed an escrow, the depository
being the grantee himself.
Hennan for the Plaintiff.
Holtzman for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Hand, J.-While this case presents a multitude of questions,
they may all be classified under one of the two main issues in this
case, namely: 1. Whether or not under the particular set of
facts, parol evidence may be admitted to contradict the import of
the delivery of the deed, and 2, Whether or not there was a binding delivery of the deed by Prince.
1. As to the admission of parol evidence to contradict a
deed, the general rule is, and should be, that such evidence is inadmissable; but just as well settled as the rule itself is the exception in the cases of fraud, accident, or mistake. Where equity
would set aside an instrument on these grounds parol evidence
is admitted. This is expressed in 17 P. F. Smith, and has been
followed throughout the cases.--200 Pa. 576.
Where, at the execution of a writing, a stipulation has been
entered into, a condition annexed, or a promise made by word of
mouth, upon the faith of which the writing has been executed,
parol evidence is admissable. This rule exactly covers the facts
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in the case at bar. Prince executed the deed upon the faith of
Sharples' promise to procure the execution by Dorn. This is held
in the case cited by the plaintiff, in 85 Pa. 369, and was well explained by Justice Tilghman in 125 Pa. 268, and has been since
followed by cases in 173 and 201.
This rule is not only well settled in Pa., but it is amply supported by outside authority. Tiffany, one of the foremost authorities in America on the law of property in land, states: "Relief will frequently be given when the legal nature and effect of
the conveyance as written does not correspnd with the agreement of the parties in accordance with which it was made. This
will also be found in Pollock on Contracts, and is law in Mississippi, Minnesota and Massachusetts. 23 Iowa 288 goes very much
further than it is necessary to go in the case at bar.
2. The second point in the case is as to the delivery of the
deed. The delivery was not an escrow, as a delivery in escrow
cannot be made to the grantee himself, nor can an escrow be
made without the intention of irrevocability. If it were an escrow,
the deed would not pass title until the performance of the
condition.
Since the deed was not delivered as an escrow, it becomes
and absolute delivery, but not so when the instrument is not complete on its face. In the case at the bar, two grantors were named,
only one, however, having executed. In 13 Cye 565, it is said:
"A delivery is incomplete where made by some of the parties only
to a deed, which shows on its face that it was intended to be
jointly executed, etc.
The conveyance in question purported to be by two grantors.
Only one signed. Ordinarily this signing by Prince would be sufficient to divest him of his property, but in this case delivery was
conditioned upon the signature of Dorn. The condition failing,
there was no delivery. 31 Miss. 17 9 Rich. (.S C.) 234, '16 Me. 140
33 Am. Dec. 645. See also Tiffany on Real Property, for
the proposition that delivery is a matter of intention. See 8
Watts 11.
In 9 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law (2 Ed.), 145-158, it is stated:
"A deed in the body of which several grantors are named, but
which is signed only by part of them, is ordinarily effectual to
convey the interest of those that do sign. (This is the case cited
by defendant's counsel in Walker vs. Walker). But if it is in
contemplation of the parties that all shall sign before the deed
shall take effect, as where the signing by one is inducement for
the signing by another, then the deed is not valid unless signed
by all." This sums up the law that has been previously stated,
and is an uniform rule in the States.
To briefly sum up the case: The plaintiff was only willing
to convey his property if Dorm would convey his share thereof.
He gave the incompleted deed to the defendant for the purpose of
obtaining this signature, in which event, it was agreed that Sharples could keep the deed, after its complete execution. Sharples
failed to get Dorn's signature, but none the less fraudulently retained the deed. The parol evidence was admissable. Furthermore there was no valid delivery. The fact that the grantor
reserved the right to revoke the conveyance, or to resume con-
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trol of the instrument, shows conclusively that there is no delivery, since it negatives the intention that title shall immediately vest in the grantee. Delivery of a deed is a mixed question of
law and fact, on which there neither is, nor should be many fixed
or arbitrary rules. But some of the elementary rules thereon are
well settled, and one is that a deed will not be regarded as delivered while anything remains to be done by the parties proposing to deliver it (4 Whart. 382) as where it is delivered on condition that it shall not become effective until executed by all the
grantors, and it is never so executed.
The case of Haviland vs. Haviland, in 105 N. W., 354, is in
point, and states the rule that should govern the case at bar.
Equity looks to the substance of a transaction, rather than to the
form, and the substance here certainly does not show an intentional conveyance of property.
Decree for concellation of deed granted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A deed does not pass title to the land described in it, until it
is delivered.
By delivery is not meant the giving of possession of the deed
to the grantee, but the giving of such possession with the simultaneous intention that it shall at once pass the title.
The grantor may hand the deed to the grantee with one of
several purposes, e. g., to enable the grantee to see whether its
form and phraseology are satisfactory, or as here, to enable him
to secure the execution of another grantor, who has not yet signed
it.
In this case, the deed was handed to the grantee in order that
he should obtain the execution of Dorn, a co-tenant, within a week,
and if he failed to obtain Dorn's signature, that he should return the deed to Prince. Proof of this purpose is admissible. Delivery is a matter of act and intention, and must be proved. An act
which has some semblance of a delivery, may be shown not to be,
in fact, a delivery in the technical sense. A deed does not affirm delivery of itself; evidence of delivery must be outside of
it. The case, then, does not present the question of contradicting or modifying a writing by parol, but the question whether
the writing took effect in consequence of a delivery. The evidence shows that the deed was put into the posession of Sharples, in order that he should get, within one week, Dorn's signature, with the duty to return it, if Dorn's signature was not
procured.
That signature has not been procured. The learned court
below has properly required the return of the deed to the

plaintiff.

The Appeal is dismissed.
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HENRY ADAMS vs. HENDERSON
Estate Tail--Life Estates-Rule in Shelley's Case-Act of
27 April, 1855
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harris devised his farm to his wife for life, then divided onehalf of the farm to be given to his son, Henry, if living at her
death, for his life and on his death his share shall pass to his
descendants then living as they would have taken had Henry then
died seized of the land. Henry claiming a fee has contracted to
sell a fee to Henderson who refuses to pay the price agreed on,
viz. $4,000.
Schoenly for the Plaintiff.
Sloan for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Schatz, J.-The question for determination in the case at
bar is: Did Adams take an estate tail which by the Act of April
27, 1855, has been enlarged to an estate in fee simple or did he
take but a life estate. This is merely a question as to whether
the Rule in Shelley's Case is or is not applicable.
In Volume I, Rawles' Revision of Bouviers Dictionary the
word "Descendants" is defined as: "Those who have issued from
an individual including his children, grandchildren and their
children to the remotest degree." In the same volume the word
"Issue" is defined as: "Descendants" and goes on to say that if
the term issue be used in the sense of heirs as comprehending a
class to take by inheritance, it is to be interpreted as a term of
limitation and brings the case within the Rule in Shelley's Case,
which interpretation will prima facie be given to it; but, if the
context of the will indicate a different intention "issue" will be
sustained as a word of purchase. Stout vs. Good 245 Pa. 383;
Beckley vs. Reigert 212 Pa. 91; and 156 Pa. 285. However, that
the word issue which is synonomous of descendants, is a word of
purchase is held by the weight of authority. In Taylor vs. Taylor
63 Pa. 481, "If it appear either by expression or clear implication that by the word issue, in this case descendants, the testator
means issue living at a particular period, it must be construed as
a word of purchase and Shelley's Case would not apply. In
Robins vs. Quinlin 79 Pa. 333 "If there be on the face of the will,
sufficient to show that the word was intended to be applied only to
descendants of a particular class at a particular time, it is to be
construed as a a word of purchase. In Jones vs. Jones 201 Pa.
548 it is held that when a testator annexes words of explanation
to "heirs" or "heirs of his body" such as "then living" using
terms as a mere description personarum, or for specific description of individuals, a new inheritance is engrafted upon the heirs
to whom the estate is given and they will be assumed to take as
purchasers. McCann vs. McCann 197 Pa. 452; Hill vs. Giles 201
Pa. 215; Findlay vs. Riddle 3 Binney 139.
Whether the intention of the testator in the case at bar was
to limit the descendants to those living at a particular period is
made clear by the words "then living." But the words then liv-
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Ing and words similar to them will not, in and of themselves be
sufficient to reduce a word of limitation to a word of purchase
166 Pa. 445, but when a word such as descendant which is not a
technical word of limitation, is used, the burden of proof is on
him who claims such words to be the equivalent of "heirs" or
"heirs of his body" to demonstrate that intention. But if the intention of the testator is repugnant to the Rule in Shelley's Case,
the intention will not be considered for the Rule is an absolute
one and not constructive.
When superadded words of limitation are joined with a special direction for distribution it is conclusive evidence of an intent that the remainderman shall take as a purchaser. Stout vs.
Good 245 Pa. 383.
The able counsel for the defedant errs when he says the
courts have not adjudicated a case like the case at bar. Lee vs.
Sanson 245 Pa. 392 is a case in point. The testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife for life and directed that at her
death the property should be divided into shares. He then devised to his son, Charles, a life estate in his share if he shall then
be living. Upon his decease his share of said realty shall pass to
his descendants, then living, who shall take in such proportions
with like force and effect as they would have taken had he died
actually seized and possessed thereof. The court held that only
a life estate was created.
In view of the law above stated the court holds that the estate which Henry Adams received was an estate for life and the
Rule in Shelley's Case does not apply.
That Henderson does not have to pay the price agreed on is
the decision of the Court and judgment must be entered for the
defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Can the plaintiff convey a good title in fee to the defendant?
The learned court below properly concludes that the applicability or non-applicability of the rule in Shelley's case must
decide.
The testator gives the land to Henry, if living at the death
of his mother, "for his life." On his death, his share shall pass to
his descendants then living. The time for "passing" is Henry's
death, and to whom should it pass but to persons "then living?"
And if these persons are descendants, to whom but descendants
then living, could it pass? Nevertheless, since these words are
taken to restrict the descendants, as they must, that fact is held
to prevent the inference that the land is to pass by inheritance,
and to require the inference that it is to pass directly from the
testator.
The learned court below has prudently followed Lee vs. Sanson, 245 Pa. S92, in holding that Henry has only a life estate, and
that the gift to his descendants is strictly a gift to them and not
to Henry.
The judgment is affirmed.
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PENROSE, RECEIVER vs. HAMMOND
Suit by Recever-Set-off-Executors and Trustees
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit on a note of Hammond's for $1500. He seeks to set
off a debt of the bank, to himself as administrator of Y for
$500, and another to himself as trustee of Z for $750. The
court has refused to permit the set-off.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Doyle, J.-The question presented in the case at bar is:
May the Defendant, Hammond, who is being sued in his own right
by Penrose, the receiver of an insolvent bank, use as a set-off
against his own note, debts owed to him by the bank, as administrator and trustees of other persons.
As stated by the able attorney for the plaintiff, "The foundation of Set-off is the prevention of circuity of actions; and cross
demands must be held in the same persons and in the same rights
so that actions may be maintained thereon each against the
other."I
Although the defendant contends that the granting of the
set-off in this case would prevent circuity of actions, it is not evident from the facts how this could be true.
In the present case, the action is against the Defendant for
his own personal debt, and the demand which he endeavors to setoff is not his own, but one in which the only right he has is as a
representative of others. So if the requested set-off were permitted, new causes of action would arise in the persons for whom
Hammond is acting as representative, and instead of preventing,
such a ruling would increase circuity of actions.
Hunter vs. Henning, 259 Pa. 347, a case cited by the attorney for the plaintiff is directly on point. In this case it was
held that an executor or trustee cannot set-off debts owed to him
as a representative, in an action brought against himself by a receiver of an insolvent bank, for his own personal debts. The
court gave as a reason for so holding that such a set-off could
not be allowed because of lack of mutuality in quality of right
with respect to the counter claims. ,
As this ruling prevents an executor or trustee from misappropriating funds entrusted to him for others, to his own use,
we feel that it is just, and that the case at bar should be decided
accordingly.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed and
the requested set-off is not permitted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Hammond, as administrator of Y, deposited $500, and as
trustee for Z, deposited $750 in the bank of which Penrose is receiver. He could have withdrawn these deposits at any time, and
could have sued the bank if it refused to repay them. 2 P. & L.
Dig. Decisions, col. 2075. Cross-Reference Annual, Col 587. In
one of the cases cited an "assignee," who in that name had made
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a deposit, was allowed to pay with it, his individual debt to the
bank. Lanbach vs. Leibert, 87 Pa. 55.
It would be an advantage to the estates for which Hammond
was a fiduciary, if he could have used the bank's claim against him
for them. The justice who writes the opinion in Hunter vs. Henning, 259 Pa. 347, remarks: "The manifest effect of such a setoff would be to enable the debtor to pay a debt of his own with
money belonging to other people." p. 354. But, another result
would be that he would use the fund of the bank (his debt to it)
in partial payment of its debt to the cestuis que trust.
The only tangible objection to this result is, that it might
give a preference in payment by an insolvent bank, to two of
its creditors; or to the common trustee of them.
This may seem a deplorable result. It may be sufficient to
justify the doctrine that Hammond must pay his debt to the receiver, rather than retain it for application to the funds of which
he is trustee and executor.
The judgment of the learned court below is AFFIRMED.
HARRIMAN vs. SAUNDERS
Verbal Contracts-Statute of Frauds-Sales
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the premises of Saunders, X was making additions and
repairs. X was to receive $1000, furnishing all the material and
labor. Saunders deposited $1000 with M, from which payments
were to be made from M to X on Saunder's order. X applied to
Harriman for the sale of $200 worth of lumber. Doubting X's
solvency, Harriman saw Saunders, who told him that he had deposited the One Thousand Dollars with M, and that on his getting
an order from X on M, he would be paid the price of the lumber.
Harriman then furnished the lumber but M declined to pay
the $200 on X's order because he had already paid out the whole
of the One Thousand Dollars deposited with him.
Shahadi for the Plaintiff.
Surran for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Yost, J.-The action brought by the plaintiff is assumpsit for
money amounting to $200 said to be owing to him by the defendant by reason of the sale of lumber to X, a contractor working for
the defendant. The contention of the plaintiff is that the defendant contracted to pay the plaintiff for the lumber, i. e., that
the defendant imposed upon himself a primary obligation to pay
the debt, to which or compared to which, X's obligation to pay
was merely secondary and incidental. In support of which above
stated contentions, he cites 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 77, 174 Pa. 602,
111 Pa. 471, 190 Pa. 263.
The defense set up is the statute of frauds. The defendant
contending that the statements made by him in no way made him
responsible for the payment of the money now claimed due to the
plaintiff. He cites, in support of his claim Nugent vs. Wolfe
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(also cited by plaintiff, see above) 111 Pa. 471, 66 Pa. Superior Ct. 238, 68 Sup. 415.
The case of Nugent vs. Wolfe 111 Pa. 471, cited by both
counsels is irrelevant to the issue in this case and does not in any
way resemble the facts of the case at bar.
The question to be decided here is based on whether or not
the statute of frauds now in force in Pa. is applicable here.
We are of the opinion that this case does come within the
statute of frauds and perjuries enacted and passed in Pa. in 1855.
Were it true, that as the plaintiff contends, the words used by the
defendant created a primary obligation to pay the debt, then
certainly this action would stand.
The defendant merely directed the plaintiff as to the manner
in which he would best be assured payment for the materials furnished by him. I do not think he did any more. Be that as it may,
it does not enter into the case, as it is sufficient that at the very
most, the defendant's words created no more than a promise to
pay and therefore must be in writing in order to sustain an action.
As there is no writing or memorandum in the evidence submitted,
we are compelled to decide the case in favor of the defendant.
X is in no way released from his liability but it is unavoidable that hardship be worked here. If the plaintiff is unable to
collect from X, by reason of insolvency or his being executionproof it is one of the hardships arising by reason of the necessity
for such a statute as the one governing this case. The statute is
largely necessary by reason of the fact that parties interested in
an action or suit are now competent witnesses, and as everyone
is presumed to know the law, we must presume that the plaintiff
was aware of the necessity of a written instrument to secure himself from loss in this case.
In support of the decision we cite 68 Pa. Superior 415, Riley
vs. Kahan, a case exactly on point, also 66 Pa. Superior Ct. 211,
two recent cases and the authorities cited therein and render
judgment for the defendant.
Judgment for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Saunders is sued for $200. for lumber furnished by Harriman. Did Saunders agree to pay for it? We think he did. He
told Harriman that, if he obtained from X, the builder, an order
on M, with whom he, Harriman, had deposited $1000, "he would
be paid the price of the lumber."
Was this promise one to pay the debt of another? We do
not see that it was. As to any other person than Saunders, the
debt was that of X. Was it X's debt? When X applied to Harriman for the lumber, the latter, doubting his solvency, saw
Saunders, and, so far as appears, determined to let X have the
lumber on Saunder's undertaking. The lumber was to go into
Saunder's house. We do not see that any debt for it on the part
of X arose. The sale seems to have been for Saunders's house,
and on his promise. As it does not appear, then, that X became
a debtor for the lumber; that the lumber was sold to him, we
cannot say that there was a debt of X, the primary debt, and that
Saunder's debt was secondary. There was no promise to pay the
debt of another.
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But even if X became a debtor, and the primary debtor, we
think Saunder's promise not within the statute of frauds. He
was owner of the house. He was making repairs. In engaging
the lumber to be at the service of X, he was promoting his own
scheme of improvement. If Harriman had furnished the lumber
to X, the price of it might have been made a lien on the house.
Providing for payment was a means of averting such a lien. See
Arnold vs. Stedman, 45 Pa. 186, and cases in 20 P. & L. Digest,
columns 34, 880, 34881. The defendant's promise was made to
secure lumber in order that it might be incorporated into his
house.
In Peter vs. Kahan, 68 Super. 415, the court finds that the
promise was that another should fulfill his contract. We are not
able to find that X became purchaser of the lumber, and promised
to pay for it.
We must therefore announce a different result from that
reached by the learned court below.
Reversed, with a v. f. d. n.
REED vs. JOHN HOLDEN AND WIFE, SARAH
Assault-Liabhity of Husband for Wife's Torts

STATEMENT OF FACTS
An action was brought against the husband and wife to recover damages alleged to have resulted from the assault by the
wife. The case was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict
against both defendants and judgment was entered.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Werner, J.-The question to be decided is whether a husband can be joined in a suit for assault when he was in no way
connected with it. His liability, if any there be, rests wholly upon
the fact that he was the husband of the woman whose assault inflicted the wrong complained of.
At common law the husband was liable to respond in damages for torts of his wife whether present or not. The act of
1848 still recognized many limitations, the later Acts of 1887
and 1893 have practically and almost completely emancipated
the married woman save in so far as it was thought to be for
her benefit to restrain her separate action in regard to her property in the very few instances named.
Section two of the Act of 1887, June third, provides that a
married woman shall be capable of entering into and rendering
herself liable upon any contract relating to trade, etc., and of
suing and being sued either upon such contract or torts done to
or committed by her as though she were a feme sole. The act also
states that the husband need not be joined with her as either plaintiff or defendant, or be made a party to any action of any kind
brought by or against her in her individual right. The act of
June 8th, 1893, P. L. 344, provides that hereafter a married
woman may sue and be sued civilly in all respects and in any
form of action with the same effect and results and consequences
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as an unmarried person. This only goes to show that since a married woman has been given the full use of her own property she
should like other adults human beings be responsible for her own
voluntary misconduct.
In Gustine vs. Westenberger 224 Pa. 455, it was held that
under the act of 1893 the wife and not her husband was liable in
damages for her torts. In this case it was unneessary and improper to join the husband as a defendant.
In the case then is no assignment of error that would warrant a reversal of the judgment of Sarah Holden, the actual tort
feasor.
It is therefore considered that the judgment as against Mrs.
Sarah Holden be affirmed while as against Mr. Holden it be
reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
At common law, the husband was liable for torts of the
wife. He continues to be liable unless that law has been modified by legislation. Two acts of assembly have been passed, which
are assumed by the courts to have taken away the husband's liability, i. e., the act of June 3rd, 1887, and that of June 8th,
1893. Although they do not expressly say that the husband shall
not be liable, they are construed to abolish his liability. "Under
the act of 1893," says Brown, J, "she (the wife) and not her
husband, is liable in damages for her torts." Gustine vs. Westenberger, 224 Pa. 455. This was cited in Smith vs. McChesney,
238 Pa. 538, as holding that the husband's liability for the wife's
torts had been abolished. The Superior Court takes the same
view of the question in Hinski vs. Stein, 68 Super. 141, where a
joint judgment against Stein and wife, for a slander committed
by the wife, was affirmed as to the wife, but reversed as to Stein.
It follows, then, that the judgment of the learned court below, supported by its succinct and clear opinion, must be
AFFIRMED.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Commercial Law Cases

By Harold L. Perrin and Hugh W. Bobb.

Doran Co., 1921.

New York: George H.

2 vols, pp. XXI, 536, XV, 414.

Mr. Perrin is the head of the department of law of the College of Business Administration, and the College of Secretarial
Science, Boston University and Mr. Bobb is an assistant professor
of law in the same department. They state that the object of the
book is to furnish material adequate for a two years' course in
commercial law in colleges, and constitute an attempt to combine
the advantages of the text book and case systems and to eliminate
some of the disadvantages of each. The method pursued to attain
this end is to preface the cases collected under each sub-division
with a short statement of the general principles applied by the
courts in the cases that follow. The subjects covered are: Contracts, Sales, Agency, Negotiable Instruments, Partnership and
Corporations. To cover so much ground in two volumes the authors have made their own statements of the facts involved in the
cases and the student thus avoids the task of eliminating nonessential facts. Only excerpts from opinions are printed and
these are restricted to the single point which it is intended to impress upon the student. The authors admit they have been forced
to take many liberties with the reported cases to render judgments
so truncated more readable and to aid concentration.
The theory of the authors is that the study of cases is valuable by way of illustration of the application of the principles
stated in the text matter rather than as a method of developing
the student's power of analysis and his ability to state accurately
in his own language the legal principle which controlled the decision of the case. All case books used in law schools omit the
syllabus printed in the reports but the authors of these volumes
have not hesitated to print the doctrine of each case immediately
after their statement of the facts and before the excerpt from the
opinion.
On page 381 of the recent bulletin published by the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, entitled: "Training for the Public Profession of the Law," it is said: "Schools
that utilize cages to illustrate or develop legal principles previously presented in predigested form, rarely describe themselves for
what they are-schools that vitalize the otherwise dead body of
text book information by excellent supplementary features, but
schools which none the less move on a secondary plane where
students acquire fundamental principles at second hand rather
than through their own efforts."
The authors of this book have attempted to give such an extent of knowledge that it was, of course, necessary for them to
sacrifice mental discipline and thoroughness. The fact remains
that it is a hollow pretense to say that one who uses this book in
his classes is applying the case method of teaching law.
On the other hand an examination of the cases used will
disclose the fact that the authors have on the whole made selection of those cases which are familiar to the students of the case
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books compiled for use in law schools. A careful study of these
volumes will give the student a large amount of legal information
and an understanding of the reasons underlying many of the rules
of law he learns. The authors have performed a valuable service in preparing a book which is calculated to produce much better results than a mere text book and it must be admitted that it
would not be practicable to cover in the time allowed more than
a small fraction of the subjects included in these volumns, if the
use of the real case system were attempted.
Handbook on the Law of Persons and Domestic Relations by Walter
C. Tiflany. Third Edition by Roger W. Cooley, LL.M. West Publishing
Company,, St. Paul, Minn., 1921.
This book has been in use in Law Schools and by lawyers, for a good
many years. Covering more than 750 pages, it first contains chapters on
marriage; rights and duties incident to coverture: effect of coverture on
rights of property, the wife's statutory separate estate antenuptial and post
nuptial settlements, separation and divorce. Part A deals with Parent
and Child, and treats, m separate chapters of legitimacy and adoption, duties of parents and rights of parents and of children. The third part treats
of guardians, their appointment, riots and duties, and the termination of
guardianship. Part III discusses infants, persons non compotes mentis
and aliens. The last part treats of Master and Servant. The editols
work, displayed for the most part, in the notes, has been well done. The
book is to be commended for its succinctness and for the excellence of its
classifications. Like all the hand books of the West Publishing Company,
it may be safely recommended to the attention of students of the branches
of the law with which it professes to deal.

